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COMMENT
EXCESSIVE RESTRICTION ON EMPLOYERS'
PREDICTIONS DURING UNION
REPRESENTATION CAMPAIGNS
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Board (Board) continues
to regulate the content of campaign speeches made during
the thousands of union representation elections held each
year.' The Board's goal in regulating the campaign speeches
is to protect the employees' right to freely choose whether a
union will represent them in labor negotiations. The regula-
tions are enforced to ensure that the elections are conducted
under "laboratory conditions."2 However, in pursuit of this
goal, the Board has restricted an employer's right to express
its views on union representation. Specifically, the Board
has established and applied controls that prohibit employers
from articulating predictions of substantive adverse conse-
quences of unionization. This comment will examine the
development and current status of the Board's restrictive
policy concerning employers' predictions. In addition, this
article will attempt to demonstrate that the Board's restric-
1. The Board conducted 8,198 conclusion representation elections in fiscal 1980,
compared with 8,043 such elections a year earlier. The elections involved a total of
458,114 employees. The unions were victorious in 45.7 percent. 45 NLRB ANN. REP.
3, 17 (1980).
2. This goal has often been articulated by the Board. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 125 (1948);
NLRB ANN. REP. 60 (1968).
The Board regulates campaigns by setting aside the election when the Board finds
valid objections to conduct allegedly affecting the outcome of the election. The Board
may set aside an election without finding an unfair labor practice. General Shoe
Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948). In addition, if an unfair labor practice is found,
the election will be set aside. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 (1962).
A finding of an unfair labor practice may also result in an order to bargain. NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). The remedy imposed is a function of the
perceived total impact of the employer's illegal campaign practices. For a succinct
summary of the Board's procedures for regulating campaign tactics, see J. GETMAN,
S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REAL-
rry 6-11 (1976).
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tions are not supported by the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) or the case law interpreting and applying the
NLRA.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The National Labor Relations Act (also known as the
Wagner Act)3 was passed in 1935 to protect the right of "em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing."' 4 The key section of the
Wagner Act is section 7, which was originally drafted as:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.5
Congress provided for enforcement of section 7 by declaring
in section 8(a)(1) that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."6
After adoption of the Wagner Act, the early Board deci-
sions required employers to take a position of strict neutral-
ity towards the union representation elections. The Board
based its position upon two major concepts. First, any state-
ment by an employer against union representation coerced
employees because of the employer's position of economic
power over the employees.7 Second, the Board held that the
employer had no interest in the choice of bargaining repre-
3. Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (currently codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 151-69 (1976)).
4. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, CASES ON LABOR LAW 73 (9th ed. 1981).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
6. Id. § 158(a)(1).
7. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, AN
OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES 292-93 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as NLRB OUTLINE]; 3 NLRB Ann. Rep. 125 (1938); Note, Restrictions on
Employer's Right ofFree Speech During Organizing Campaigns and Collective Bargain-
ing, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 40, 43-44 (1968). This position assumes the behavioral truism
"free choice cannot be exercised in the face of threat or coercion." Grunewald, Em-
piricism in NLRB Election Regulation: Shopping Kart and General Knit in Retro-
spect, 4 IND. REL. LJ. 161, 165 (1982). This view was expressed by the Board in
wheeling-Steel Corp., I N.L.R.B. 699, 709 (1936).
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sentatives since it was the employees' exclusive concern.8
Until 1941 the courts generally enforced the Board's abso-
lute restriction on the employer's ability to express its views
on union representation.9
The shift away from the requirement that employers re-
main strictly neutral and mute concerning their views to-
ward their employees' union representation began with the
Supreme Court's decision in Yhornhill v. Alabama.'0 There
the Court applied the first amendment right to free speech to
labor disputes, stating that "the dissemination of informa-
tion concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded
as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by
the Constitution."I' The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit immediately enforced the Supreme Court's recognition
of an employer's right to free speech in Midland Steel Prod-
ucts Co. v. NLRB,12 where the court held that even though
the employees' vote may have been influenced by a letter
from the employer which stated that all employees would be
treated the same whether or not they joined a union, the let-
ter did not interfere or coerce.13 Shortly thereafter, the Sixth
Circuit extended the employer's right to free speech by rec-
ognizing an employer's right to disseminate its views toward
union representation.' 4
In 1941 in the landmark case of NRLB v. Virginia Electric
& Power Co. ,'5 the Supreme Court recognized the em-
ployer's first amendment right to express its views on union
representation of its employees. The Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Murphy, held that the Wagner Act does
not enjoin "the employer from expressing its view on labor
8. A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 141; NLRB OUTLINE, supra
note 7, at 292-93.
9. Eg., NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 23 N.L.R.B. 342 (1940), enforced as mod fed,
122 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1941); NLRB v. Falk Corp., 102 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1939).
10. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
11. Id at 102.
12. 113 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 1940).
13. Id The court said that "[u]nless the right of free speech is enjoyed by em-
ployers as well as by employees, the guaranty of the First Amendment is futile, for it
is fundamental that the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution belong equally to
every person." Id
14. NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 913 (6th Cir. 1940).
15. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
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policies or problems, nor is a penalty imposed upon it be-
cause of any utterances which it has made."1 6 The Court
refused to affirm the Board's finding of an unfair labor prac-
tice which was based solely on an employer's innocuous
statements to its employees. 17
While it is generally agreed that Virginia Electric "abol-
ished the assumption that the employer's position made his
expressions in the organizing context coercive per se,"' 8 the
Court also held that employees are protected by the Act "[i]f
the total activities of an employer restrain or coerce his em-
ployees in their free choice."19 The Court's discussion of the
totality of the employer's conduct has been interpreted to
give the Board broad discretion in evaluating the employer's
speech.20 However, in view of the emphasis the Court
placed on the employer's constitutional right to express its
views and the severe conduct of Virginia Electric & Power
Company, it is clear that flagrant employer interference in
the election process could transform protected speech into
coercive speech.2
In the early 1940's the law controlling employer speech
was fairly stable with the Board permitting most employer
speech "so long as [the employer] did not imply that he
would punish the employees if they chose to organize."22 In
1947, Congress continued the trend toward a stronger em-
16. Id at 477. The court also stated, "[t]he employer in this case is as free now as
ever to take any side it may choose on this controversial issue." Id
17. The employer's statement characterized the previous 15 years as a period dur-
ing which the company and its employees enjoyed a "happy relationship." It went on
to say that the employees were free to submit grievances, and the mutual interest of
all could best be promoted through confidence and cooperation. Id at 471-72 n.5.
18. Note, supra note 7, at 44. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 (1945);
NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967).
19. 314 U.S. at 477.
20. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946); 11 NLRB ANN. REP. 34 (1946);
Note, supra note 7, at 44-45.
21. Virginia Electric & Power Company was attempting to persuade its employ-
ees to form their own internal union as opposed to joining an "outside" union. The
company's conduct included surveillance of a rival union meeting, interrogation of
employees, threats of discharge for "messing" with the outside union and discharges
of four employees for their union activities. On the basis of the conduct, the unfair
labor practice charges were eventually upheld. Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB,
132 F.2d 390 (4th Cir. 1942), aft'd, 319 U.S. 533 (1943).
22. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 74-75 (1964).
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ployer right to free speech by passing the Taft-Hartley
Amendments.2 In creating section 8(c), 2 4 Congress initially
considered, but eventually rejected, a provision for the eval-
uation of the context of an employer's actions to determine
whether an employer's speech was coercive. 25  After the
Taft-Hartley Amendments, an employer's right to express its
views was firmly established and its speech would fall
outside of constitutional protection only if the speech or the
employer's related conduct clearly coerced employees. 6
During the 1950's the Board continued the trend started
in Virginia Electric by giving substantial latitude to employer
speeches.27 During the 1960's, however, the Board28 "made
23. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1973)). For a thorough
discussion of the impact of the Taft-Hartley Amendments on employer free speech
rights, see Cox, Some Aspects ofthe Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 15-20 (1947).
24. Section 8(c) states: "The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or
the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practie ... if such expression con-
tains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1973).
25. See H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d)(1) (1947). Senator Taft indicated
that the compromise version of section 8(c) limits the extent to which employer con-
duct can be applied to determine whether its speech is not protected by the
constitution:
The House conferees were of the opinion that the phrase "under all the
circumstances" in the Senate amendment was ambiguous and might be suscep-
tible of being construed as approving Board decisions which have attempted to
circumscribe the right of free speech where there were also findings of unfair
labor practices. Since this was clearly contrary to the intent of the Senate, ...
the Senate conferees acceded to the wish of the House group that the intent of
this section be clarified.
93 CONG. Rac. 601 (1947).
The Board decision Senator Taft was referring to was Clark Bros. Co., 70
N.L.R.B. 802 (1946), which found otherwise protected employer speech coercive
merely because the employees were assembled during working time to hear the
speeches. See Note, supra note 7, at 45 n.21. The limitations for using employer
conduct to interpret its speech as coercive were specifically recognized in NLRB v.
Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1967).
26. Judge Bok states that in section 8(c), Congress applied the same standards
normally accorded public debate under the first amendment. Bok, supra note 22, at
77.
27. Id at 74-75. See, e.g., Southwester Co., IlI N.L.R.B. 805 (1955); Esquire,
Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 1238 (1954); Silver Knit Hosiery Mills, Inc., 99 N.L.R.B. 422
(1952). However, in 1948 the Board enhanced its power to regulate elections by de-
claring that it could set aside an election even though the employer was not guilty of a
§ 8(c) violation. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126-27 (1948). See A. Cox,
D. BOK & R. GoRMAN, supra note 4, at 142, 143; Grunewald, supra note 7, at 167.
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a serious attempt to prevent abuses by placing more strin-
gent limitations on the employer's power to speak. ' 29 The
swing back from the latitude granted to employer election
speeches was based on the practical effect of the former pol-
icy which gave "hostile employers great leeway to indulge in
dire predictions in order to dissuade the employees from
supporting the union. 30
Although the Board had a valid concern in protecting
employees from employers who applied their economic clout
to prevent lawful unionization, a review of the Board's deci-
sions indicates that it often overprotected the employees' in-
terests. Judge Bok believes that overprotection actually
detracts from the employees' exercise of their free choice be-
cause the employees are prevented from having access to rel-
evant information.31  The Board's efforts to limit an
employer's preelection speech were generally supported
when employers declared that operations would have to shut
down and the employees would lose their jobs if they voted
for the union.32 But other Board decisions that restricted
employer speech concerning other allegedly adverse conse-
quences of union representation were criticized and often re-
versed.33 During the 1960's, as the Board attempted to limit
28. The change in the perspective of the Board was brought about by a change in
membership. See A. Cox, D. BOK & R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 144.
29. Bok, supra note 22, at 75.
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id at 77. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yokell, 387 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1967); Collins &
Aikman Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 15 (1963).
33. See Bok, supra note 22, at 76-82. Judge Bok criticizes Lord Baltimore Press,
142 N.L.R.B. 328 (1963) (election set aside because employer stated that it intended to
litigate); Oak Mfg. Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963) (election set aside because employer
presented information which showed that the employees received higher wages than
employees at union plants); Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962) (election set aside
because employer stated that the present wage policy was fair and that the union did
not have the economic power to compel the employer to change).
In addition, the courts of appeals often refused to enforce the restrictive policy of
the Board. The Board was reversed in Bendix Corp. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 141 (6th Cir.
1968) (statement in a vigorous campaign that wages and benefits could decrease if
company forced to bargain with union was not a threat); NLRB v. Uniform Rental
Serv., 398 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1968) (letter that plant would continue to lose money if
the union was elected was not a threat); NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.
1967) (letters to employees concerning various adverse consequences of unionization
were not threats).
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employee speech, the issue developed as to whether an em-
ployer's statements were mere predictions or prophecies, or
whether the statements were illegal threats.
III. CREATION OF STANDARDS FOR THE THREAT OR
PREDICTION ISSUE
In 1968 the Supreme Court met the prediction or threat
issue in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 34 That landmark deci-
sion, written by Chief Justice Warren, established guidelines
the Board and the courts must use in determining whether a
statement is a prediction or an illegal threat. In formulating
its standards, the Court balanced the employer's right to free
speech against "the economic dependence of the employees
on their employers" 35 and the resulting tendency of employ-
ees to "pick up intended implications . . . that might be
more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear."'36 Chief
For a detailed analysis of the cases leading up to Gissel Packing Co., see Com-
ment, Employer Free Speech: Threats, Opinions Predictions of Dire Consequences -
The Advent of a Clearer Standard, 18 S.D.L. REv. 441, 448-53 (1973).
34. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). Gissel was a consolidation of four cases - three from
the Fourth Circuit and one from the First Circuit. The court established the predic-
tion versus threat issue in the case from the First Circuit, NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397
F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). For a discussion of the facts in Sinclair Co., see infra note 41.
35. 395 U.S. at 617. The Court did not break new ground by classifying employ-
ees as economically dependent on their employers. In 1936 the Board observed that
"[t]he employee is sensitive to each subtle expression of hostility upon the part of one
whose good will is so vital to him, whose power is so unlimited, whose action is so
beyond appeal." Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 709 (1936). In addition, these
assumptions are considered implicit in the Wagner Act. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935); Phalen, The Demise of Holywood Ceramics: Fact andFan-
tasy, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 450 (1977).
However, it can be argued that the Court overstated its case by declaring, in effect,
that all employees are economically dependent on their employers. Economic depen-
dence exists in labor relationships only where the employee possesses insufficient
marketable skills to enable him or her to find other employment or is tied to the
present job by other factors, such as there being no other employer nearby or the
employee's reluctance to relocate. Although certain employees are economically de-
pendent on their employers, other employees, particularly employees with a skill or
trade, are often not dependent. The Court cited no evidence to support its conclusion
that employees are per se dependent on their employers. Nevertheless, several courts
have adopted this position. See NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934, 940 (3d Cir.
1980); Mon River Towing, Inc. v. NLRB, 421 F.2d 1, 9 (3d Cir. 1969). But see Mid-
land Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1489 (1982) (Board abandoned its
"protectionist" role in factual misrepresentation claims).
36. 395 U.S. at 617. This statement is conclusory. The Court cites no evidence to
support this position except that the alleged economic dependence causes employees
to overreact to employer statements and succumb to a fear that they will lose their
1983]
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Justice Warren specifically acknowledged the employer's
right to free speech but added that the right did not include
"communications [that] . . . contain a 'threat of reprisal or
force or promise or benefit.' 37 The Court further noted
that the employer may make predictions "as to the precise
effects he believes unionization will have on his company,"
but "the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of
objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demon-
strably probable consequences beyond his control or to con-
vey a management decision already arrived at to close the
plant in case of unionization." 38 Chief Justice Warren ex-
plained the distinction between a threat and a prediction:
If there is any implication that an employer may or may
not take action solely on his own initiative for reasons un-
related to economic necessities and known only to him, the
statement is no longer a reasonable prediction based on
available facts but a threat of retaliation based on misrep-
resentation and coercion, and as such without the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. 9
Some courts of appeals have held that the above princi-
ple is a broad restriction on an employer's first amendment
right of free speech.4° However, a close examination of the
facts involved in the Gissel decision41 clearly indicates that
jobs if they vote the union in. Thus, it can be argued that the Court is saying that
employees lose their ability to make a rational decision concerning union representa-
tion. The concept that employees' preference for a union is fragile was attacked in a
landmark empirical study. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note
2, at 140-41.
37. 395 U.S. at 618.
38. Id
39. Id
40. See Rimmer v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 656 F.2d 323, 328 (8th Cir.
1981); NLRB v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 633 F.2d 766, 792 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980);
Martin Tractor Co. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 627 F.2d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
41. The Supreme Court summarized the facts surrounding the union election at
the employer's company:
During the two or three weeks immediately prior to the election on December
9, the president sent the employees a pamphlet captioned: "Do you want an-
other 13-week strike?" stating, inter alia, that: "We have no doubt that the
Teamsters Union can again close the Wire Weaving Department and the en-
tire plant by a strike. We have no hopes that the Teamsters Union Bosses will
not call a strike. . . . The Teamsters Union is a strike happy outfit." Similar
communications followed in late November, including one stressing the Team-
sters' "hoodlum control." Two days before the election, the Company sent out
another pamphlet that was entitled: "Let's Look at the Record," and that pur-
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Gissel was not intended to reverse the established precedent
recognizing the employer's right to free speech. The presi-
dent of the defendant employer made statements to his em-
ployees which the Board and the Supreme Court interpreted
as threats of retaliatory actions for voting for the union. The
subject matter of the objectionable statements is critical to
understanding the intended impact of Gissel. The em-
ployer's statements were held to convey the following
message:
[T]hat the "strike-happy" union would in all likelihood
have to obtain its potentially unreasonable demands by
striking, the probable result of which would be a plant
shutdown, as the past history of labor relations in the area
indicated; and that the employees in such a case would
have great difficulty finding employment elsewhere.42
Thus Gissel clearly involved a case where an employer
threatened employees with severe and far-reaching conse-
quences if the union was elected. These consequences in-
cluded plant closure, with its potential for long-term
unemployment. The Court indicated its overriding concern
about the threatened plant closure by specifically referring to
the prior plant closures43 when stating the rule that predic-
tions must be based on "objective fact" 44 and must "convey
an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable conse-
quences beyond his control. 45
Clearly, the basis for citing Gissel as a broad restriction
of employer free speech is suspect. The Gissel Court specifi-
ported to be an obituary of companies in the Holyoke-Springfield, Massachu-
setts, area that had allegedly gone out of business because of union demands,
eliminating some 3,500 jobs; the first page carried a large cartoon showing the
preparation of a grave for the Sinclair Company and other headstones contain-
ing the names of other plants allegedly victimized by the unions. Finally, on
the day before the election, the president made another personal appeal to his
employees to reject the Union. He repeated that the Company's financial con-
dition was precarious; that a possible strike would jeopardize the continued
operation of the plant; and that age and lack of education would make re-
employment difficult. The Union lost the election 7-6, and then filed both
objections to the election and unfair labor practice charges which were consoli-
dated for hearing before the trial examiner.
395 U.S. at 588-89.
42. Id at 619.
43. Id at 618. For a summary of the Gissel rule, see supra text accompanying
notes 38 & 39.
44. 395 U.S. at 618.
45. Id
1983]
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cally recognized an employer's right to free speech when it
said that "an employer's free speech right to communicate
his views to his employees is firmly established and cannot
be infringed by a union or the Board. ' 46 The decision specif-
ically focused upon the risk of plant closure facing the em-
ployees. However, as the following discussion indicates, the
Board has extended the Gissel test to severely limit an em-
ployer's right to free speech during union election
campaigns.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GISSEL STANDARD
A. Formulation of the General Rule
Although the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co.47 attempted to set guidelines concerning permissible
preelection campaign speeches, the result has been an incon-
sistent and confusing body of regulatory law. The courts of
appeals have formulated a fairly consistent statement of the
Gissel test. The general rule is succinctly stated as follows:
It is well established law that an employer has the right to
express an opinion or predictions of unfavorable conse-
quences which he believes may result from unionization.
Such predictions or opinions are not violations of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act if they have some reasonable
basis in fact and provided that they are in fact predictions
or opinions other than veiled threats on the part of the em-
ployer to visit retaliatory consequences upon the employees
in the event that the union prevails.48
The two primary factors the courts consider in applying
the Gissel test are "the extent to which the prediction is
based on demonstrable probabilities; and the extent to which
the adverse consequences warned of are within the em-
ployer's control. '49 Although the language of the rule seems
clear, its application has rendered inconsistent results in
cases with similar fact situations. This is somewhat under-
46. 395 U.S. at 617.
47. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
48. NLRB v. General Tel. Directory Co., 602 F.2d 912, 914-15 (9th Cir. 1979)
(citing NLRB v. Lenkurt Elec. Co., 438 F.2d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 1971)).
49. NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934, 938 (3d Cir. 1980).
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standable since determining whether an employer's state-
ment is a veiled threat involves an inherently subjective
analysis of the circumstances surrounding the statement,5"
the behavioral assumptions underlying the regulation of
union representation elections, 51 and the motivation behind
the statement.52
However, albeit not without exception, certain patterns
have emerged during the twelve-year reign of the Gissel
guidelines.53 The Board's initial applications of Gissel often
resulted in a finding that employer statements regarding
likely plant closures were illegal threats. As the 1970's
progressed, the Board applied Gissel to expand its policy of
restricting employer speech. The Board began to prohibit
employer statements describing various adverse conse-
quences of union representation. Generally, with some no-
table exceptions, the circuit courts have been reluctant to
interfere with the Board's determinations. As the cases be-
low indicate, the result has been to severely restrict an em-
ployer's campaign speech far beyond the threats of plant
50. See J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676, 681 (4th Cir. 1980); NLRB v.
Laredo Coca Cola Bottling Co., 613 F.2d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1980).
51. The behavioral assumptions underlying the entire spectrum of labor law, es-
pecially union representation elections, have been the subject of much discussion and
criticism. One commentator concluded that recent empirical studies
raise[d] doubts about the validity of a number of specific tenets of union elec-
tion regulation, but also call into question the larger issue of the Board's char-
acteristic practice of relying almost exclusively on unverified behavioral
assumptions and the abstract elaboration of legal principles as the skeleton on
which to build the body of labor law.
Roomkin & Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB Regulation: .4 Proposal, 90
HARv. L. REv. 1441, 1442 (1977). See Bok, supra note 22, at 46-53, 88-90. See gener-
ally Getman & Goldberg, The Myth ofLabor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L. REv.
681 (1972).
52. For a statement to be defined as coercive, the statement must reflect the
speaker's intent to take retaliatory action. In Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local
633 v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court of appeals stated:
[C]oercion must surely be interpreted to mean more than a persuasive argu-
ment that certain events will occur which are distasteful to the listener. Rather
coercion is defined by reference to the will of the speaker - does the speaker
intend to perform an act for no other reason than that the listener is in favor of
the union?
Id at 495-96 (emphasis in original). See also NLRB v. General Tel. Directory Co.,
602 F.2d 912, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1979).
53. See R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, PUBLIC POLICY SERIES, INDUSTRIAL
RESEARCH UNIT - UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 63-92 (1974) (general discussion
of the Gissel standard and the early cases applying it).
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closure and long-term unemployment which were the facts
underlying the Gissel decision.
B. Plant Closures
The facts and the legal analysis in Gissel clearly indicate
that the Court was primarily concerned with employer
threats of plant closure. This is reflected in the early deci-
sions which applied Gissel to plant closure statements. In
Campbell Chain54 the Board set aside an election when it
found the employer had conveyed the message that it would
close down the plants if the union made exorbitant wage de-
mands. The Board reasoned that such statements had "an
obvious potential for interference with the free choice of
[the] employees."55  In NLRB v. Taber Instruments, Inc. ,56
the Second Circuit enforced a Board order where the em-
ployer statements implied that if the union won the election,
certain operations would possibly be transferred to other
plants. The court applied the Gissel analysis and held that
the statements were illegal threats. 7
The law concerning plant closures remained relatively
stable throughout the 1970's and into the 1980's.5 8 The strin-
gent restrictions placed on employer predictions of potential
future plant closing reflect the widely accepted assumption
that:
if the employees are led to believe that the company will
simply close down automatically if the union is selected,
54. 180 N.L.R.B. 51 (1969).
55. Id at 52.
56. 421 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1970).
57. Id at 644.
58. See Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1982) (general
discussion of the law applicable to employer statements on plant closures). Recent
Board decisions finding employer predictions of plant closures objectionable include:
Associated Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 1349 (1981) (employer's predic-
tion that unionization would result in loss of jobs because area contractors were antiu-
nion was not supported by any objective facts which demonstrated employer would
be "fatally noncompetitive"); Crown Cork & Seal Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 14 (1981) (em-
ployer's prediction that unionization would cause closure of plant due to mandatory
30% to 40% increase in wages, leading to expected loss of plant's sole customer, did
not have "objective factual basis" because customer's willingness to pay increased
costs was not considered); Overnite Trans. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 132 (1981) (statement of
"automatic job loss" due to the predicted closing of marginal terminals did not con-
sider effect of negotiations). See Williams, Distinguishing Protected From Unprotected
Campaign Speech, 33 LAB. L.J. 265, 270-71 nn.21-22 (1982).
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they are left with a devastating and improper assertion
which the organizer is unable to rebut save by pointing out
that the employer cannot carry out his plan without violat-
ing the law. 9
However, the restrictions on plant closure or transfer state-
ments have been extended to include not only statements
threatening plant closure, but also statements describing pre-
vious plant closures which may leave the impression that if
the union is elected, plant closure will occur again.60 These
decisions seem to ignore Judge Bok's caveat that "it is also
important to avoid discovering veiled threats or sinister am-
biguities by placing a strained interpretation on the em-
ployer's remarks. 61
59. Bok, supra note 22, at 77. However, Judge Bok indicates this generally ac-
cepted behavioral assumption may not be valid. See Foreward to J. GETMAN, S.
GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY
xi-xiii (1976).
60. Thus, employers cannot discuss potential future plant closures unless the de-
cision has already been made. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618
(1969). The Fifth Circuit articulates this rule as follows: "prediction of plant closure
in the event of a union victory constitutes a coercive threat if the statement is 'unac-
companied by a proven causal link to specific union economic demands.'" Chromal-
loy Am. Corp. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1124 (5th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Mangurian's,
Inc., 566 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1978).
In addition, employers must be wary of discussing prior plant closings in the com-
pany. One commentator articulated the rule as follows:
If the purpose of the story is to rebut union claims that it can guarantee job
security - and not to lay the blame for the plant closing at the union's door -
this should be clearly spelled out. If, on the other hand, the plant closing re-
sulted from economic conditions caused by the union, those economic condi-
tions and the union's causative role should be carefully, truthfully, and
provably set forth.
Latham, Employer Campaign Information: Is Truth a Defense?, 6 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 498, 502 (1980-81) (emphasis in original). See also Williams, supra note 58, at
265-71. See TRW-United Greenfield Div. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1981);
General Dynamics Corp., 250 N.L.R.B. 719 (1980).
61. Bok, supra note 22, at 77. This sentiment was recently expressed by Board
Member Hunt in his dissent in Hahn Property Mgmt. Corp., 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1043 (1982). Member Hunt stated that "an appreciation of this Agency's proper role
in overseeing representation matters, coupled with a modicum of common sense,
compels the conclusions that this Board has no business engaging in a strained and
hypertechnical reading of campaign material as a basis for overturning an election."
Id. at 1044 (Hunt, Member, dissenting).
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C Other Adverse Consequences of Unionization
1. Board Decisions
The decisions of the Board continue a policy developed
during the 1960's to restrict the employer's right to free
speech.62 This policy was applied in the Board's 1969 deci-
sion in Boaz Spinning Co. 63 In that case the employer made
two carefully prepared speeches which referred to incidents
at other plants where the election of a union coincided with
a disruption of traditionally friendly employment relations
and the plant's inability to effectively compete in the market-
place. The Board found that the speeches contained "less
than subtle suggestions that the employees were better off
without a union than with one." 64 The Board then decided
the employer's free speech rights did not protect those
speeches, basing its decision on the grounds that the
speeches instilled fear of collective bargaining in the em-
ployees and that they indicated that union representation
was "a complete excursion into futility."65
The further development of the Board's restriction on
employer free speech during the 1970's is illustrated by com-
paring its decisions in Essex International, Inc. 66 and Super
Thrift Markets, Inc. 67 Essex involved a 1974 case where the
Board found that the employer told an employee "that her
recent transfer from a job involving close and frequent con-
tact with fellow employees to a job with less personal contact
was due to her [pro]union views and activities." 68  The
Board did not find that the statement contained a threat of a
change in working conditions due to union support. Rather,
the Board ruled that this statement, along with another state-
ment which implied a promise of improved working condi-
62. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
63. 177 N.L.R.B. 788 (1969), enforcement denied, 439 F.2d 876 (8th Cir. 1971).
64. Id at 789. It is difficult to imagine a more appropriate message an employer
would want to convey during a union representation campaign.
65. Id at 789-90. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit reversed the Board, citing its
long-standing recognition of employers' rights to free speech as its reason for applying
the Gissel test narrowly. Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 876, 877-78 (6th Cir.
1971). For a further discussion of the court's decision in Boaz and other Sixth Circuit
decisions, see infra text accompanying notes 106-07.
66. 216 N.L.R.B. 831 (1975).
67. 233 N.L.R.B. 409 (1977).
68. Essex Int'l, Inc., 216 N.L.R.B. at 831.
[Vol. 66:785
EMPLOYERS' FREE SPEECH
tions, did not have an impact on the election. The Board
noted that these statements were made to only "2 employees
out of a unit of 325. ''69
However, nearly three years later in Super Thrift Mar-
kets, Inc. ,70 the Board came to a different conclusion con-
cerning a conversation from which it was difficult to infer a
threat of adverse consequences. In that case a supervisor
stated to an employee while on break, "[p]oor Sherry [an-
other employee], she's out there working on the register all
alone." The employee replied, "Well what about me. . . I
work hard out there too." The supervisor answered, "[W]ell
[Sherry is] a good girl . . . because she's not for the
Union. ' 71 The Board determined that this conversation im-
plied a threatened change in working conditions in that the
supervisor's "appraisal of his employees' work would be af-
fected by whether they were for or against the Union"72 and
as such was a coercive threat. The Board appears to have
given the above language an exceedingly strained interpreta-
tion to find that the employer coercively threatened the
employee.
These decisions indicate that the Board will find em-
ployer statements objectionable even though the statements
clearly satisfy the traditional Gissel standards which measure
whether the statements are true and based on demonstrably
probable consequences. This attitude is evident in recent
Board decisions. For example, in General Dynamics Corp. 73
an employer made several entirely truthful statements dur-
ing a union election campaign. The employer informed its
employees of its prior experiences with collective bargaining.
These experiences included defeats for the union in eleven
out of fourteen previous elections held at company plants
and long delays in the bargaining process, during which
wages were frozen. The employer also explained that the
69. Id However, the election was decided by only four votes, 145 to 149.
70. Super Thrift Markets, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. 409 (1977).
71. Id at 409. But see Brooks Bros., 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1127 (1982) (Board
appeared to consider the truth of an employer's statement that "there was no guaran-
tee of higher commission rates" in ruling that statement was not coercive threat).
72. Super Thrift Markets, Inc., 233 N.L.R.B. at 409.
73. 250 N.L.R.B. 719 (1980). One commentator described the Board's decision in
the case as an "aberration." Latham, supra note 60, at 498-502.
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union might ask for concessions which would strengthen the
union's own position at the expense of the employees. The
employer recounted previous long and violent strikes at
other of its organized plants, and noted that violence and
strikes are a possibility when there is a union present.74 The
Board set aside the election 75 based on the perceived coer-
cive impact of the employer's statements considered as a
whole. The Board ruled:
The Employer's numerous references to strikes, violence,
loss of business [sic] loss of jobs, and loss of benefits
amounted to veiled threats and created an atmosphere of
fear. In the context of these specific threats, the Employer's
repeated statements associating the Petitioner with strikes,
plant closures, and job loss had a coercive impact on the
employees.76
The problem with the Board's decision is that the Board
did not analyze the statements under the Gissel test, but in-
stead merely concluded that the statements constituted
veiled threats.77 Moreover, the Board did not consider the
truthfulness of the statements.7 8 Although truth is not an ab-
solute defense, the Board gave no indication that any of the
statements were intended to convey the impression that the
employer would take retaliatory actions against the employ-
ees if the union was elected. Thus, the Board appears to
have expanded its definition of what constitutes a threat to
include any statement of adverse consequences, regardless of
74. 250 N.L.R.B. at 719-22. The employer also made statements concerning prior
plant closings and transfers. The analysis here primarily concerns the other objec-
tionable employer statements. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63, for analysis
of the plant closure issue.
75. The election was set aside even though the union was defeated by a substan-
tial margin. The vote was 272 to 203 against the union. Id at 719.
76. Id at 722.
77. See Latham, supra note 60, at 500-02. The author points out that all of the
statements were true or demonstrably probable; that is, the election losses did occur,
the long delays and wage freezes did occur and are not uncommon during initial
bargaining sessions, unions are known to bargain for self-preserving contract provi-
sions, the past violent strikes did occur, and a strike is a distinct possibility whenever a
union is present.
78. In addition, the Board discounted any impact of the employer's disclaimers
that the statements were not threats to close the plant or reduce wages. General Dy-
namics Corp., 250 N.L.R.B. 719, 723 (1980). See Latham, supra note 60, at 501.
[Vol. 66:785
EMPLOYERS' FREE SPEECH
whether it carries the threat of adverse action by the
employer.79
In McGraw Edison Co. 80 the Board again refused to con-
sider the truthfulness of an employer's statement. In that
case the employer told its employees that if a rival union
won the election, sales would fall because union electricians
would refuse to install the company's lighting fixtures prod-
ucts because the products were not manufactured by union
members. The employer pointed out that this exact situation
had occurred twenty-five years earlier when sales fell be-
cause electricians refused to install company products which
did not include the union's label. In addition, the employer
demonstrated that it is a regular practice of the industry to
verify that the fixtures are made by the union.81
The Board disregarded the prior incident since it oc-
curred twenty-five years ago and simply refused to accept
the evidence of the industry practices,8 2 although no contrary
evidence was introduced. The Board held that the em-
ployer's predictions "posed a threat to the very livelihood of
the employees. 83 Thus, even though the employer's state-
ments satisfied Gissel in that they were true and based on
unrebutted "demonstrably probable" evidence, the Board
held them objectionable.
Another recent case which clearly exposes the Board's
policy of restricting employer speech by construing reason-
able predictions as coercive threats is International Harvester
Co. 84 The dispute involved the employer's prediction that if
the union were elected, the employees would lose their sav-
ings and investment program (SIP)85 and their promotional
79. See supra note 52. See also Latham, supra note 60, at 502.
80. 259 N.L.R.B. 702 (1981).
81. Id at 703.
82. Id.
83. Id
84. 258 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1981).
85. Id at 1163 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). SIP is an attractive program.
In SIP, participating employees allow the company to deduct a portion of their pay;
the company "in turn matches the deduction with its own funds and invests the total
on behalf of the employees." It is reasonable to conclude that if employees faced the
possibility of losing their interests in SIP in the event of representation they would
want to be aware of that possibility.
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opportunities. The Board found the employer's statements
were illegal threats and ordered a new election.86
The Board noted that on several occasions the employer
stated that the employees would lose their SIP if they voted
for the union. The basis for the employer's statement was
the fact that the company had a national contract with the
union that was campaigning for election. The national con-
tract, which automatically applied to all newly-elected units,
did not have a SIP provision. When the contract was appli-
cable, the SIP would automatically be discontinued. The
employer pointed out that although the SIP is negotiable, no
other organized plant had been able to retain its eligibility
for participation in SIP.87
The Board determined that the employer, by informing
its employees of the loss of SIP, had threatened the employ-
ees. The majority reasoned that since SIP was subject to ne-
gotiations, it was within the employer's control, and thus a
threat.8 8 This reasoning by the majority extends the Gissel
test to such an extent as to render it a nullity. Any change in
working conditions is theoretically within an employer's
control. The employer could unilaterally agree to maintain
or adopt any existing wage, benefit or other working condi-
tion desired by the union. Thus, as dissenting Board Mem-
ber Zimmerman pointed out, the majority's application of
the Gissel rule would effectively prevent employers from
making any prediction of adverse consequences of unioniza-
tion, because only "inevitable consequences" could be dis-
cussed.89 The majority's analysis thus extended Gissel far
beyond its narrow factual situation.
86. Id. at 1162 n.l. The first election was held in February, 1980; the union lost
44 to 112. Even though a new election was held in October, 1981, the outcome was
the same, with the union losing 26 to 64.
87. Id at 1163 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting).
88. Id at 1162 n.3.
89. Id at 1164 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting). Any prediction involves in-
herent uncertainty; otherwise it is not a prediction but a statement of fact. A matter
subject to collective bargaining is clearly not a certainty. Thus, limiting an employer
to making predictions that are inevitable, effectively prohibits employers from making
any predictions at all.
, The International Harvester majority equated "demonstrably probable conse-
quences," (See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969)), with "inevita-
ble." Clearly this was not intended by the Wagner Act or the Supreme Court. See
International Harvester Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1981) (dissenting opinion).
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The second area of dispute in International Harvester
concerned the employer's prediction of a loss of promotional
opportunities. The employer's statements were based on the
fact that the national contract limited employees' seniority
rights to their own units. Consequently, the unit employees,
if organized, would have no contractual seniority rights in
other organized and nonorganized units.90 The employer
stated that if the union were elected the company would not
have a contractual obligation to recognize an employee's or-
ganized unit seniority in evaluating transfer applications to
fill nonorganized jobs. The Board found that those state-
ments were coercive threats.91 It appears that the majority
concluded that since the contract did not specifically prohibit
the employer from recognizing organized unit seniority, the
employer controlled the seniority bidding policy.
The dissent pointed out that the employer's statement
concerning the organized employees' lack of contractual
rights to bid their unit seniority for nonorganized jobs was
completely accurate. The key distinction was that while or-
ganized employees could still apply for jobs in nonorganized
units, the national contract did not grant the organized em-
ployees any seniority rights for such transfers.92 Thus, the
clerical employees who formerly were able to bid their sen-
iority for other nonorganized jobs under company policy
would lose that ability if their clerical unit organized. The
dissent concluded that the employer's comments were "rea-
sonable, objective predictions of probable adverse conse-
90. This dispute arose because the clerical group attempting to organize was for-
merly able to bid its seniority for technical group jobs. Since the technical group was
not attempting to organize, the clerical employees began to question the future status
of their present seniority rights if the union were elected. International Harvester Co.,
258 N.L.R.B. at 1165.
91. However, the company also noted that it would continue to accept requests
for transfers from organized units to nonorganized jobs, but that there would be no
seniority rights in the event of unionization. Id at 1165-66.
92. The employer argued that:
[S]eniority for bidding to promotions to non-unit jobs is not a subject for nego-
tiation. If the union sought to extend seniority rights beyond the certified unit,
it could violate the Section 7 rights of employees outside the bargaining unit to
refrain from union activity, and would unlawfully benefit represented employ-
ees by granting union represented employees additional rights in these non-
unit jobs.
Brief of International Harvester Co. at 14-15, International Harvester Co., 258
N.L.R.B. 1162 (1981).
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quences, and not threats of retaliation. ' 93  Since
management could not control the seniority rights of organ-
ized employees and its statements were accurate, the Board
misapplied the Gissel test. These cases seem to indicate that
the Board will find objectionable virtually any statement
that is adverse to the union.
2. Circuit Courts of Appeals
The recent Board decisions indicate that the Board has
severely restricted the employer's right to free speech in
union election campaigns. However, the circuit courts of ap-
peals have generally been reluctant to prohibit the Board
from implementing its restrictive policy. Generally, some
circuits seem to support the Board's restrictive policy, while
others perform only a limited review of the Board's decision.
In NRLB v. Garry Manufacturing Co. 9 4 the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the employer's statements that
the union would make unreasonable demands were threats
of "adverse consequences of unionism per se."95 The court
affirmed the Board's decision even though union handouts
compared current employee wages to substantially higher
average wages in other industries. The court concluded that
since the employer indicated it would not give in to the
union's unreasonable demands, it evidenced a willingness to
strike. Like recent Board decisions, 96 the court's decision fo-
cused on the employer's perceived ability to "control" work-
ing conditions, such as wages, that were subject to future
negotiations.97
The circuit courts often fail to thoroughly analyze the
Board's application of the law. This is evident from the
broad deference usually given to the discretion of the Board.
For example, where the Board finds an implied threat, the
court will not upset that finding if it is supported by substan-
tial evidence on the record as a whole. Citing Universal
93. 258 N.L.R.B. at 1166.
94. 630 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1980).
95. Id at 938-40.
96. See McGraw Edison Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 702, 703 (1981); International Har-
vester Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 1162 n.3 (1981).
97. If an employer has the ability to absolutely "control" the working conditions
that are subject to negotiation, the negotiations have no purpose.
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Camera Corp. v. NLRB,98 the courts consider it improper to
"displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting
views [of the facts], even though the court would justifiably
have made a different choice had the matter been before it de
novo°'99 In addition, courts often state that "[c]redibility
resolutions are peculiarly within the province of the trial ex-
aminer and thd National Labor Relations Board and are en-
titled to affirmance unless inherently unreasonable or self-
contradictory."1 00 Finally, the courts apply a general stan-
dard of review which holds that the Board's finding of a sec-
tion 8(a)(1) violation should be upheld when "the
misconduct is such that, under the circumstances existing, it
may reasonably tend to coerce or to intimidate employees in
the exercise of rights protected under the Act."''
The insulation the above standards give to Board deci-
sions generally protects them from the probing analysis they
appear to require. Despite those standards, however, the
Sixth Circuit subjects Board decisions to probing judicial
analysis.102 In NLRB v. Hobart Brothers Co. 103 the Sixth
Circuit refused to enforce the Board's finding of a threat in
the employer's warnings of possible disclosure by the union
of employees who signed union cards. The court held that
the Universal Camera Corp. test "actually was aimed at re-
minding Courts of Appeals that they cannot abdicate the ju-
dicial function in scrutinizing Board decisions."'' 4 The court
determined that it, not the Board, had special expertise in
"construing and interpreting written instruments." 0 5 More-
over, in Hobart Brothers the Sixth Circuit laid the founda-
98. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). See Sioux Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 1251, 1253
(7th Cir. 1982); Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483, 487 (1Ith Cir. 1982);
Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 666 F.2d 238, 239 (5th Cir. 1982); NLRB v.
Anchorage Times Publishing Co., 637 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Garry Mfg.
Co., 630 F.2d 934, 937 (3d Cir. 1980).
99. 340 U.S. at 488.
100. NLRB v. Proler Int'l Corp., 635 F.2d 351, 355 (5th Cir. 1981). See also
NLRB v. Chester Valley, Inc., 652 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 934, 937 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Local
542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 850, 852-53 (3d Cir. 1964).
102. See, e.g., Midland Steel Prods. Co. v. NLRB, 113 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1940).
103. 372 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1967).
104. Id at 206. See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 490
(1951).
105. 372 F.2d at 206.
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tion for judicial interference with the Board's policy of
restricting employer speech. The court stated, "[t]he em-
ployer's constitutional right of free speech, also guaranteed
under Section 8(c), should not be so easily restricted.' °6 In
Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB'0 7 the Sixth Circuit refused to
acquiesce in the Board's application of Gissel to prevent em-
ployers from demonstrating adverse consequences of union-
ism, such as plant closures, strikes, loss of jobs, when the
statements reflected events that actually occurred. The court
cited its long-held position that "the right of free speech in a
union organizational campaign is not to be narrowly
restricted."' 0 8
The Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed its position on an
employer's right to free speech in NLRB v. Fisher Cheese
Co. 109 The court refused to enforce a Board finding that a
letter warning employees that the union may disclose the
identities of employees who signed authorization cards was
not a coercive threat." 0 The court did not agree with the
Board's apparent position that Gissel warranted a finding of
a "veiled threat of economic retaliation.""' The court did
not construe Gissel as a restriction on employers' rights to
free speech which would require a reversal of their liberal
free speech position. Thus, the Sixth Circuit maintained its
position that Board decisions applying constitutional law
will be thoroughly reviewed and employers' free speech
rights will not be narrowly construed.
While the Sixth Circuit has traditionally recognized an
employer's right to free speech, other circuits have only oc-
106. Id The court felt that it was up to the parties in the campaign to rebut any
claim which they found inaccurate or misleading.
107. 439 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1971), denying enforcement of 117 N.L.R.B. 788
(1969). See supra text accompanying notes 63-65, for a discussion of the Board's
decision.
108. 439 F.2d at 878. See also Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756 (6th
Cir. 1965).
109. 652 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1980), denying enforcement of 238 N.L.R.B. 626
(1978).
110. 652 F.2d at 608-09.
111. Id The court chided the Board for disregarding the court's prior decision in
NLRB v. Hobart Bros. Co., 372 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1967), which held that a nearly
identical statement by an employer was permissible. The court also noted that the
Board relied on its own prior decision in Sparton Mfg. Co. which had been overruled
by the Seventh Circuit. NLRB v. Sparton Mfg. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 948 (1965), enforce-
ment denied, 355 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 66:785
EMPLOYERS' FREE SPEECH
casionally recognized a similar employer right. For exam-
ple, in NLRB v. Lenkurt Electric Co. ,112 the employer made
statements about potential adverse consequences of unioni-
zation such as stricter working rules, more difficult working
conditions, lower fringe benefits and loss of employee flex-
ibility for intercompany transfers, which were all based on
prior company experiences. The Ninth Circuit reversed the
Board and held that an employer could make "predictions of
possible disadvantages which might arise from economic ne-
cessity or because of union demands or union policies."' 1 3
The court applied a narrow construction of an illegal threat
in stating that a threat is a statement which "indicate[s] that
[the employer] will, of his own volition and for his own rea-
sons, inflict adverse consequences upon his employees if the
union is chosen."' 1 4 The court concluded that a liberal right
to employer free speech benefits the employee in that it pro-
motes a complete exchange of views which enables employ-
ees to make informed and reasoned choices.11 5
More recently, in NLB v. Eastern Smelting & Refning
Corp. ,116 the First Circuit upheld the employer's right to free
speech. In that case the Board found an implied threat
where the employer told its employees that fourteen years
earlier a strike had occurred and several employees conse-
quently lost their jobs. The First Circuit implied that the
Board determined the statement was a threat merely because
it was distasteful. The court pointed out that the Board's
conclusion was not supported by analysis or discussion and
stated that "[t]o state [past events as simple fact] cannot be
condemned by the process of calling it a threat; the employer
is not restricted to pleasant facts."' " 7 Thus, unlike the Board,
the First Circuit considers the truth of the employer's state-
ment an important factor in determining whether the state-
ment is a threat." 8 Moreover, the court held that Gissel was
112. 438 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1971).
113. Id at 1107.
114. Id at 1106.
115. Id at 1108.
116. 598 F.2d 666 (1st Cir. 1979).
117. Id at 672.
118. See Latham, supra note 60.
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not a broad restriction of an employer's right to free speech;
rather, Gissel applied to statements that portray an "exagger-
ated effect" 1" 9 of adverse consequences of unionization.
Another case in which a court of appeals refused to en-
force the Board's order to bargain which resulted from ob-
jectionable employer predictions of adverse consequences of
unionization is Patsy Bee, Inc. v. NLRB. 20 There the com-
pany president told his employees that two major customers
would refuse to do business with Patsy Bee if the employees
elected the union. The president's statements were based
upon remarks made by a representative of one of the cus-
tomers, the current precarious financial condition of the
company and the president's prior experience at other
plants.' 2 1 The court applied the Gissel analysis and refused
to enforce the Board's order. The court ruled that the presi-
dent's statement represented "'economic consequences rea-
sonably forseeable as a result of predictable responses of key
customers.' On the whole, the statements reflected his belief
based upon objective facts, that unionization could have an
adverse economic impact on Patsy Bee."' 2 2 The decision
supports the basic right of an employer to freely express rea-
sonable predictions of adverse consequences of unionization
during union representation campaigns.
V. EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE
The preceding analysis demonstrates that many of the
Board's determinations that employers' speeches constitute
actual or implied threats are made without any objective
analysis or are supported by a misapplication of the Gissel
test. In this manner, the Board has been able to further its
policy of broadly restricting the employer's right to free
speech. The Board's policy is based on the assumption that
119. Eastern Smelting & Ref. Corp., 598 F.2d at 672. An example of an "exag-
gerated effect" is an employer's statement that "employees lacking proper immigra-
tion documents would be either fired or picked up by immigration authorities if the
union won the election." Sioux Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 684 F.2d 1251, 1255 (7th Cir.
1982). There the court properly found that the employer's statement violated section
8(a)(l) of the NLRA, using the Gissel test. Id
120. 654 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981).
121. Id at 517.
122. Id at 517-18 (quoting the administrative law judge).
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employees will interpret ambiguous statements by their em-
ployer as threats or reprisals. This assumption embodies the
perceived economic dependence of the employee on the em-
ployer. Moreover, the Board's decisions assume that em-
ployee preferences can be easily shattered by campaign
threats, promises or misrepresentations. These assumptions
have not been challenged in the courts because of the courts'
deference to the Board's expertise in determining which
campaign speeches tend to interfere with an employee's free
choice. 123
However, not only is the Board misapplying the law, but
its behavioral assumptions underlying its regulations of
union representation elections also have been severely ques-
tioned.1 24 In 1964 Judge Bok was one of the initial commen-
tators to note that the Board's behavioral assumptions were
not supported by empirical evidence and that there was a
need for empirical data regarding factors influencing em-
ployee voting. 2 5 Twelve years later, Professors Getman,
Goldberg and Herman completed an exhaustive empirical
study of union representation elections. 26 The purpose of
the study "was to determine whether unlawful campaigning
has a greater effect on voters than does lawful campaign-ing.",927 The study consisted of interviewing employee-vot-
ers before and after thirty-one representation elections which
were expected to be vigorously contested. 28 The authors de-
termined that unfair labor practices had been committed in
twenty-two of the elections. 29 However, the study found
that ninety percent of the voters had a firm intent to vote for
123. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969); NLRB v. Vir-
ginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469,479 (1941). See also NLRB v. Garry Mfg. Co.,
630 F.2d 934, 938 (3d Cir. 1980); Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d
699, 702 (9th Cir. 1978).
124. See Bok, supra note 22, at 42,45,73-74; Grunewald, supra note 7, at 193-94.
125. Bok, supra note 22, at 40.
126. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 2. See also Field &
Field, "... . And Women Must Weep" v. "Anatomy of a Lie": An EmpiricalAssess-
ment of Two Labor Relations Propoganda Films, 1 PEPPERDINE L. Rv. 21 (1973);
Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1963).
127. Goldberg, Getman & Brett, Union Representation Elections: Law and Real-
ity.- The Authors Respond to the Critics, 79 U. MICH. L. REv. 564, 567 (1981).
128. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 2, at 22-53 (discus-
sion of the methodology of the study).
129. Id at 111-13.
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or against the union at the time the campaign began. More-
over, of those, eighty-seven percent voted in accordance with
their precampaign disposition despite frequent unlawful
campaigning. 130
The inescapable conclusion of the Getman, Goldberg
and Herman study is that an employee's vote is not signifi-
cantly affected by the content of the campaign. The authors
noted that "[s]ince union supporters are not coerced by
threats of reprisal. . . into voting against a union represen-
tation, threats. . . should [not] be a basis for setting aside an
election or finding an unfair labor practice."' 131 The authors
recommended an end to regulation of any employer conduct
or speech, including express and implied threats, during a
representation election.1 32 Such a conclusion is significant
because it undercuts a body of regulatory law which has de-
veloped over several decades. Not surprisingly, the study
has met with resistance from the Board.
33
The Board has not applied the Getman, Goldberg and
Herman study to the threat-prediction issue. However, the
Board did adopt the conclusions of the study in refusing to
overturn an election because of a claim of factual misrepre-
sentation in Shopping Karl Food Market, Inc. 134 Twenty
130. The authors summarized the results of their study in Goldberg, Getman &
Brett, supra note 127, at 569.
131. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & . HERMAN, supra note 2, at 147.
132. Id at 147-48, 150.
133. The Board may have anticipated the results of the Getman, Goldberg &
Herman study: the Board forced the authors to go to court to obtain access to needed
information. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
134. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977). In Shopping Kart the majority determined that
elections would no longer be set aside on account of misleading campaign statements
unless the employer had engaged in deceptive campaign practices such as forgery.
The Board noted that the ill effects of the rule requiring truth and accuracy in cam-
paign statements include "extensive analysis of campaign propaganda, a restriction of
free speech, variance in application as between the Board and the courts, increased
litigation, and a resulting decrease in the finality of election results." Id at 1312. The
Board relied on the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study's conclusion that the con-
tent of campaign speeches has little effect on the employee's vote. Id at 1313 (citing
Getman & Goldberg, The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation of
Campaign Misrepresentations: An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REv. 263, 276-79
(1976)). The Board said that its rules "must be based on a view of employees as
mature individuals who are capable of recognizing campaign propaganda for what it
is and discounting it." Shopping Kart, 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313. See A. Cox, D. BOK &
R. GORMAN, supra note 4, at 159-61.
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months later, however, the Board reversed itself in General
Knit, Inc. 135 The Board's application of the Getman,
Goldberg and Herman study in General Knit received sharp
criticism. 36
Elsewhere, the response to the Getman, Goldberg and
Herman study has been uneven. The judicial reaction ap-
pears to have been limited. 37  Congress has given the
Getman, Goldberg and Herman study a more positive re-
sponse. 38 Congress considered the study in debating provi-
sions of the proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977, which
would have reduced the Board's regulation of campaign
speech. 139 However, the Labor Reform Act was never en-
acted. 14° The academic response has been extensive and
generally favorable. 41
Although the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study may
not provide a complete framework for revising the law regu-
135. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). The Board cited the Getman, Goldberg and Her-
man study, supra note 2, for the proposition that false statements may have a substan-
tial impact on the 19% of the voters who had not clearly decided on their vote prior to
the campaign. 239 N.L.R.B. at 621-22. The Board also indicated that the size of the
study's sample (31 elections) was not sufficient to support a massive restructuring of
regulatory law. Id
136. See the dissenting opinion of Member Penello in General Knit, Inc., 239
N.L.R.B. 619, 624-36 (1978). See also Grunewald, supra note 7, at 183-84; Goldberg,
Getman & Brett, supra note 126, at 574-80.
Amazingly, the Board in its recent decision in Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 110
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1489 (1982), reversed itself for the second time on the factual mis-
representation issue. The Board returned to the Shopping Kart standard and now
"will set an election aside not because of the substance of the representation, but
because of the deceptive manner in which it was made, a manner which renders em-
ployees unable to evaluate the forgery for what it is." 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1494.
Surprisingly, although the Board appeared to readopt the conclusions of the Getman,
Goldberg and Herman study cited in Shopping Kart, the Board failed to mention the
study in the opinion.
137. See Oshman's Sporting Goods, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir.
1978) (study held to cast doubts on the Board's standards, but court deferred to the
Board's expertise). See also Goldberg, Getman & Brett, supra note 127, at 565-80.
138. See Goldberg, Getman & Brett, supra note 127, at 566.
139. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR ON H.R. REP. No.
95-637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 29, 24-35, 38-39 (1977); REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RESOURCES ON S. 2467, S. REP. No. 411-22, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11.22, 2324
(1977).
140. The law was killed by a filibuster in the Senate. See Mills, Flawed Victory in
Labor Reform, HARV. Bus. REv. May-June 1979, at 92-102.141. See Cam, Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality, 31 ARK. L.
REv. 165 (1977); Goldberg, Getman & Brett, supra note 127, at 566-67 & nn.16-24,
580-93; Henry, Journey into the Future - Role ofEmpirical Evidence in Developing
Labor Law, 1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 1.
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lating campaign speeches, especially regulation of "threats,"
it clearly provides direction. The study's conclusion that
employees are not significantly affected by any employer
speech certainly does not warrant the Board's expansive re-
striction of employer speech. Moreover, the study may sup-
port a complete deregulation of campaign speechmaking. 42
What is clearly needed is more scholarly research 43 so that
the Board can apply science toward its goal of obtaining
elections under "laboratory conditions.'"44
VI. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The goal of this comment is to point out the excessive
restrictions the Board has placed on employer campaign
speeches and the need for reducing its interference in union
elections. As discussed above, 45 the Board recently took a
significant step toward this end.
In Midland National Lfe Insurance Co. 146 the Board re-
fused to overturn an election solely because of the em-
ployer's misrepresentations. 47 Prior to Midland the Board
applied the policy of actively reviewing misrepresentation
claims which had arisen since General Knit, Inc. '48 In Gen-
142. Instead of regulating campaign speech, the authors of the study would have
the Board provide "injunctive relief to obtain reinstatement of discharged employees,
treble damages for lost earnings and lost government contracts wherever an employer
has taken retaliatory action." See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra
note 2, at 159-63. The key advantage of the proposal is that the remedies could be
imposed in much less time than the present objection of an unfair labor practice pro-
cedure requires. The present procedures often take close to two years to complete.
International Harvester Co., 258 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1981) (17 months); General Knit,
Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978) (22 months).
143. One article suggests the Board should conduct its own research and analysis
of behavioral studies to aid in formulating regulatory policy. Roomkin & Abrams,
supra note 51, at 1459-74. See also Grunewald, supra note 7, at 185-95 (analysis of
the Roomkin & Abrams proposal).
144. The Board first articulated its desire to conduct union representation elec-
tions under "laboratory conditions" in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126
(1948). See also Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-70 (1962).
145. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
146. 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1489 (1982).
147. In Midland the misrepresentations involved the union's prior performance
record and the amount the union spent on its members' and union officers' salaries.
110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1489-90.
148. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978). Board decisions concerning the factual misrepre-
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eral Knit 4 9 the Board decided to return to the Hollywood
Ceramics Co. "Io standard to review alleged factual misrepre-
sentations for any significant or material impact the misrep-
resentation may have had on the election. The Board
increased its review "in order to maintain the integrity of
Board elections and thereby protect employee free
choice." 151
In Midland the Board returned to its policy of limited
review that was the basis of its decision in Shopping Kart
Food Market, Inc. 152 Under the new rule the Board "will no
longer probe into the truth or falsity of the parties' campaign
statements, and ... will not set aside elections on the basis
of misleading campaign statements."'153  The Board further
stated that it will set aside an election only where the misrep-
resentation was made in such a deceptive manner that "em-
ployees [were] unable to evaluate the forgery for what it
was."1
54
Although the Board's new standard of limited review
specifically involves the factual misrepresentation issue, the
rationale utilized by the Board supports less interference in
elections where claims of illegal threats or predictions are
sentation issue have been volatile. The factual misrepresentation issue arose in
Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962). There the Board held that an
election would be set aside where the misrepresentation was substantial and the other
party was unable to make an effective reply. Fifteen years later in Shopping Kart
Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977), the Board decided no longer to ex-
amine the truth or falsity of campaign statements and to set aside an election only if a
party had engaged in deceptive campaign practices such as forgery. However, 20
months later, in General Knit, Inc., the Board returned to the protectionist role set
forth in Hollywood Ceramics. From 1978 until the Midland decision, the Board ac-
tively reviewed misrepresentations to determine whether the misrepresentations had a
material impact on the election at issue.
149. 239 N.L.R.B. 619 (1978).
150. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
151. General Knit, 239 N.L.R.B. at 620.
152. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1977).
153. Midland, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1494.
154. Id at 1494. The Board recently applied the Midland rule in Raddison
Muehlebach Hotel, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1681 (1982). In Raddison the company ob-
jected to alleged misrepresentations concerning loss of certain negotiated wage in-
creases if employees voted against the union. The Board interpreted Midland to have
announced the end of Board "probe[s] into the truth or falsity of campaign state-
ments." Ill L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1682. The Board concluded that since the em-
ployer's objections alleged "nothing more than misrepresentations of fact," the
objections were overruled. Id at 1682-83.
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made. In Midland the Board found the Hollywood Ceramics
rule resulted in protracted litigation and constant conflict be-
tween the Board and the courts of appeals. The Board fur-
ther stated that "in addition to finding the Hollywood
Ceramics rule to be unwieldy and counter productive, we
also consider it to have an unrealistic view of the ability of
voters to assess misleading campaign propaganda." 155 The
Board recognized employees' ability to independently ana-
lyze campaign information when it stated: "We believe that
Board rules in this area must be based on a view of employ-
ees as mature individuals who are capable of recognizing
campaign propaganda for what it is and discounting it." '56
Likewise, less Board interference in elections when an
employer articulates adverse consequences of unionization
would eliminate the same delay and waste of resources
caused by overturned elections. In addition, a relaxed stan-
dard would also promote "uniformity in national labor law
by minimizing the basis for disagreement between the Board
and the courts of appeals."1 57 Moreover, the standard would
recognize the modem view of employees as capable of mak-
ing independent decisions concerning unionization. This
view is clearly supported by the empirical study of Profes-
sors Getman, Goldberg and Herman. 158
Thus, the same rationale used by the Board in Midland
calls for a similar policy of less Board interference in elec-
tions where an employer has articulated potential adverse
consequences of unionization. The goals of increased ad-
ministrative efficiency and a uniform national labor law
would be furthered. In addition, a reduced standard would
apply modem behavioral assumptions to Board decisions.
Although the Board stated that it would "continue to protect
against other campaign conduct such as threats . . . which
interfere with employee free choice,"' 15 9 the groundwork has
155. Id (citing Shopping Kart Food Mart, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. at 1313 (1977)).
156. Id.
157. Midland, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1493. For a discussion of the courts of
appeals' reviews of Board decisions on the prediction-threat issue, see supra text ac-
companying notes 94-122.
158. For a discussion of the Getman, Goldberg and Herman study, see supra text
accompanying notes 126-44.
159. Midland, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1494.
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been laid for significant reduction in the Board's review of
employers' predictions and interference in union elections.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to demonstrate that the
Board's long-standing policy of strictly controlling employ-
ers who make predictions of adverse consequences in the
event of unionization is seriously flawed. First, the legisla-
tive history of the NLRA and early court decisions specifi-
cally recognized an employer's right to free speech.
Furthermore, the Board has misconstrued and misapplied
the test formulated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co. 160 In addition, the Board's policy of strict con-
trol fails to recognize employees as individuals capable of
making their own decisions, and such a policy is seriously
contradicted by a landmark empirical study.
Perhaps the Board's recent relaxation of its policy over
claims of factual misrepresentation in union elections fore-
shadows a similar relaxation in the Board's control over em-
ployer predictions. Such a relaxation furthers the same goals
the Board articulated in Midland,161 that is, improving
NLRB administrative economy, promoting uniformity in
national labor law, and recognizing the basic intelligence
and independence of the employee. The Board should con-
tinue the trend started in Midland and limit its review of em-
ployer predictions only to those predictions which invoke
serious and generally unsupported adverse consequences of
unionization.
MICHAEL J. BENNETT
160. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
161. 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1489 (1982).
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